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Abstract
This paper points out that there is little theoretical or empirical support for the concept
of rational performance-chasing equilibrium that appeared in the recent literature. A
more accurate model of current active market dynamics involves investor confusion, which
is partly driven by some managers’ performance manipulation. Unlike the former, the
incentive structure in the latter model is fragile and not robust to social learning. More
rationality means more passive informationless investing, which may ultimately lead to
reduced price efficiency and greater misallocation of real resources. The recent growth of
index products may continue unabated since there is no invisible hand that would limit
it.
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1 Introduction
There has been a steady growth of index funds since the 1970s. Whether index mutual funds
or the more recent exchange traded funds (ETFs), these investment vehicles allow individual
and institutional investors alike to track a broadly defined index with minimum management
fees. Prior to that, practically all investors engaged in active portfolio management, whether
directly or through an intermediary, hoping to select securities that would deliver better than
average returns. Crucially, such investing involves acquisition of information and its analysis.
In contrast, indexing is an informationless strategy involving little more than mechanical
buying and selling of securities proportional to their weight in the index. It passively relies
on the ability of the rest of the market to determine prices correctly. For the real economy
to operate efficiently, it is desirable that financial markets deliver price discovery without
excessive volatility and provide liquidity at low cost. Therefore, the ratio of active and
passive trading in the market is of great economic importance.
The objective of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we address the problem of incentives
to go active. It is often glossed over in the literature but in our view, surprisingly many
models treat the issue in an unsatisfactory manner. What might appear as a subtle point
in academic discourse has in fact profound implications for practical portfolio management,
consumer protection and regulation of institutions. Notably, we point out that the incentives
are not necessarily related to market efficiency as is often claimed. Secondly, we present a
model that integrates fragmented research on performance manipulation by fund managers
and demonstrates how powerful such practices can be, given high attrition in the industry, in
creating and sustaining confusion (‘alpha illusion’) on the part of unsophisticated investors.
Specifically, we seek to improve on the rational performance-chasing story of Berk and Green
(2004) and point out that such models tacitly overstate the amount of alpha in the system.
Without alpha illusion, market activity and the price discovery machinery would grind to
a halt. Up to a certain level, inefficiencies at the individual level may paradoxically be
desirable in order to eliminate potentially much more serious inefficiencies at the aggregate
level. Whether in academic research or policymaking, we emphasize that it is a sine qua non
for a realistic paradigm of financial market activity to explicitly recognize such an incentive
structure. For instance, the conclusion of Berk and Green (2004) or Berk (2005) that active
mutual fund managers as a group are justly compensated for the value they add to their
investors becomes rather tenuous under closer scrutiny and, implicitly, such models might
give us a false sense of security regarding the stability of the price discovery process.
Compared to passive index tracking, active strategies are associated with less risk diversi-
fication, larger transaction costs and capital gains taxes due to higher portfolio turnover and,
most importantly, with relatively high fees for delegated portfolio management. Still, the size
of the active management industry does not seem to reflect that. In the US, for instance,
the number of stock/hybrid mutual funds,1 most of them actively managed, is similar to the
number of all publicly traded stocks.2 French (2008) estimates the annual aggregate cost of
active investing in the US stock market between 1980 and 2006, over and above the cost of
passive investing, at 0.67 % of the total market capitalization.3 High compensation in the
1See www.ici.org.
2See www.wilshire.com.
3He also shows, for instance, that investors turned over the entire stock market portfolio more than twice in
2007. Bogle (2008) estimates the total cost of financial intermediation in the US and poses critical questions
about the design and efficiency of the sector. Indeed, many of them were shortly answered as the financial
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industry has attracted top talent and natural questions arise regarding social optimality of
such allocation of scarce resources.4 The absorption of human capital by markets for financial
capital has presumably improved the quality of price discovery. Public good aside, however,
we do not fully understand the investors’ (private) incentives to pursue active rather than
passive strategies.
There has been a long search for the appropriate financial markets paradigm in terms of
price discovery and for many, the jury is still out. Fama (1970) defines an efficient market as
one in which prices always fully reflect available information. When any investor comes to the
market to trade on relevant information, others have almost surely traded on that already and
so it is impossible to consistently achieve abnormal profits. The Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH), however, is little more than a conjecture about the outcome of the complex price
formation mechanism in financial markets and its proper empirical testing is difficult.5 A
closer examination of the market structure suggests that in theory, markets might easily
not be efficient. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), for instance, argue that markets cannot be
informationally efficient all the time since there would be no incentives for costly private
acquisition of information if it were immediately and fully reflected in prices.6 Taking the
latter paradigm to the real world, does it mean investors should go active?
Sharpe (1991) states succinctly the basic arithmetic behind active portfolio management.
In summary, the average active investor cannot beat the market gross of costs and, in fact, will
be beaten by it net of costs. While that does not preclude some investors from consistently
outperforming the market, many academic studies have found little empirical evidence of
their existence7 although some authors claim to have identified fund managers who have
been able to deliver significant alpha.8 Indeed, identification of true skills is no less of a
daunting task for experts than for unsophisticated investors. Nomen est omen, Weisman
(2002) exposes investment strategies employed primarily but not exclusively by hedge funds
that mask the true nature of the underlying return-generating process and tend to create alpha
illusion for a sufficiently long time to allow for rent extraction from unsuspecting investors.
He concludes that the resulting biases of traditional performance measures have “significant
negative implications for both the asset allocation process and the validity of considerable
academic research” (p. 91).
It seems rational for an investor who believes in the EMH, based on selected academic
studies, to strategically delegate (costly) price discovery to the rest of the market and go
passive. If all investors did so, however, would the EMH still hold? Would price discovery be
of the same quality if no information was generated through costly analyses by professional
investors and prices were determined, perhaps, by a handful of insiders? The textbook of
Bodie et al. (2008, p. 11), which is consistent with the curriculum of the Chartered Financial
Analyst (CFA) Program, states:
If the [EMH] were taken to the extreme, there would be no point in active security anal-
crisis of the late 2000s unfolded.
4Samuelson (1974) provides an early such challenge to the universal efforts to ‘beat the market’.
5This is because any test of the EMH jointly tests the equilibrium asset pricing model.
6Muendler (2007) demonstrates the possibility of a fully revealing equilibrium with costly information ac-
quisition if there is a finite number of investors who can adjust the size of their portfolios through intertemporal
consumption decisions.
7See e.g. Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Carhart (1997) or Quigley and Sinque-
field (2000).
8See e.g. Cohen et al. (2005), Kosowski et al. (2006), Chen and Liang (2007), Jiang et al. (2007), Cuthbertson
et al. (2008) or Cremers and Petajisto (2009).
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ysis; only fools would commit resources to actively analyze securities. Without ongoing
security analysis, however, prices eventually would depart from ‘correct’ values, creating
new incentives for experts to move in. Therefore, even in environments as competitive as
the financial markets, we may observe only near-efficiency, and profit opportunities may
exist for especially diligent and creative investors.
This conventional wisdom implies a natural limit to indexing.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 argues that although the corrective
mechanism suggested above may be intuitively appealing, we should not rely on such rational
equilibrating forces in the real world. Indeed, Woolley and Bird (2003) claim that a high
level of indexing supplemented with quasi-indexing by active managers who strictly control
their tracking error relative to a given benchmark has already contributed to excessive and
wasteful investments, which ultimately results in lower economic growth and lower investor
returns along with higher volatility associated with bubbles. We formalize and further de-
velop the underlying story. This continues in Section 3 which formally states a fundamental
alpha constraint independent of price efficiency and argues that the model of active portfolio
management by Berk and Green (2004) is driven purely by violating that constraint with lit-
tle empirical justification. The importance of clarifying the latter cannot be overstated since
such models might be incorrectly interpreted as academic endorsement of ‘rational equilibrium
performance chasing’.
In contrast, presenting an alternative paradigm, Section 4 models performance manipula-
tion by active fund managers seeking to profit from client-related rather than securities-related
informational asymmetries and it shows that the empirical attrition rate among active fund
managers combined with such manipulative techniques is sufficient to generate the illusion
that active managers tend to beat the market. Boundedly rational investors in a complex
environment may not see through that easily. However, index products are a financial in-
novation which exploits transparency of modern capital markets and, rather than increasing
complexity, combines simplicity with robust performance. Section 5 discusses whether such
investors could learn their way out of their predicament, possibly ‘externally’ through en-
hanced protection of consumers as well as shareholders of institutional investors. Section 6
concludes, stressing that the recent steady growth of index products indicates that social
learning or more broadly defined innovation diffusion is under way. This might ultimately
affect the efficiency with which capital markets service the real economy and there is rather
little policymakers could do to move the system out of such an equilibrium.
2 Capital Markets and the Passive Investment Strategy
Price discovery is an important externality from trading in financial markets. The efficient
market mechanism is supposed to average out individual forecast errors and send out the
best available signals about fundamentals.9 Therefore, it is of great import to understand
the incentives for (costly) information acquisition, its analysis and synthesis and subsequent
production of new information in the form of forecasts and informed opinions. We argue
that some financial markets, in particular those allowing for relatively precise replication of
the market portfolio, are characterized by incentives not to acquire and produce information
about the securities traded, regardless of possible mispricing. This seems especially the case
of the stock market and to a lesser extent the bond market.
9The ‘wisdom of the crowd’ is often sought after in much wider areas of human activity. See e.g. the
prediction markets at www.intrade.com.
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Doran et al. (2010, p. 175) summarize the findings of their survey distributed to over 4,000
finance professors in the US as follows:
[T]hey show little agreement regarding the semi-strong form market efficiency. Despite
their ostensible disagreement, their investing objectives suggest they generally believe that
markets are semi-strong form efficient; twice as many of them passively invest as actively
invest. We also come to the surprising conclusion that a finance professor’s opinion of
market efficiency has little influence on his decision to actively or passively invest. . . . This
contradicts the fundamental notion that the active versus passive decision is driven by an
assessment of the market’s efficiency.
While a believer in the semi-strong EMH should indeed go passive (absent inside information),
we stress that even without such a belief and with ample time at hand for active analysis, the
decisions are rather unsurprising. What is perhaps surprising is active investment strategies
of many university endowment funds in markets where ultra-cheap passive alternatives are
readily available. The following detailed analysis is an attempt to demystify the active/passive
controversy.
2.1 Sitting on the Shoulders of Giants
First, we start with a simple example. There are two firms in the economy. In the current
period, firm 1 and firm 2 issue shares and pay out terminating dividends in the next period.
No alternative assets that enable transfer of consumption over time are available. There are
two equally wealthy investors and the supply of securities is perfectly observable to both.
Investor X is of poor intelligence and little education but his virtue is that he knows that he
does not know. Investor A, in contrast, has a skyrocketing IQ, excellent education and she is
aware of both. X knows who A is and vice versa.
X, acting blindly with no analysis whatsoever, buys half of the shares in both companies,
whatever their prices. A does research into the fundamentals of the projects to be under-
taken and forecasts the terminal cash flows, which she rationally prefers to a blind bet or,
equivalently, reliance on X. She incurs cost c of the information acquisition. Depending on
her forecasts and perceived risks, she allocates part of her wealth to stocks and consumes the
rest. Assume there are equilibrium prices P1 and P2 such that A is willing to purchase half of
the shares of each company. Now for any P1 and P2, whatever the terminal cash flows turn
out to be, the return on the investment of X will be the same as that of A gross of c and the
former will exceed the latter net of c. As long as A lets X buy a scaled-down version of the
market, at whatever prices, the former has lost.
It is possible that A finds out that company 1 has superior technology and management
and its return on every dollar invested always exceeds that of company 2. In such a case, A
will never invest in company 2, neither will X (who would then have to hold all its shares
rather than a half) and the inefficient company efficiently exits the market. X still beats
A, however, and there is no (credible) mechanism through which A can unload part of c on
X or drive it out of the public market. Not all information has to be acquired in a costly
fashion, of course. Some is possessed ‘naturally’ and is distributed asymmetrically across the
investor population. But even if A were the ‘natural insider’ and c = 0, her informational
(and intellectual) superiority would not translate into superior investment performance.
5
2.2 Charity Begins at Home
Now consider a capital market where N securities are dynamically traded and their supply
Q = (Q1, . . . , QN )
′ is publicly known. Let X be an index fund buying and selling all securities
in proportion to their market supply. At time t1, it buys a fraction x of the market at the
current prices P = (P1, . . . , PN )
′. Trivially, between then and any time t2 with prices P˜ ,10
r˜X =
P˜ ′ · x ·Q
P ′ · x ·Q − 1 =
P˜ ′ ·Q
P ′ ·Q − 1 = r˜M (1)
and so the rate of return on the purchased securities, r˜X , is the same as the rate of return
on the entire market, r˜M . Similarly, let A be an active fund conducting security analysis
and setting prices which X, as it buys and sells fractions of the market, passively accepts.
Assume for a moment that investors cannot trade directly and can only invest through the
two intermediaries. Therefore, in the absence of (active) competition, we prevent A from
taking advantage of X by setting prices away from its valuations.
Both funds are marked to market and a marginal investor decides which one to buy. If
X holds the fraction x ∈ (0, 1) of the market at time t1, A’s holdings are (1− x) ·Q and so
by (1), the return on the latter between then and any future time t2 is r˜M . For simplicity,
the services of X are free while A charges its investors active management fees. Hence, the
return to the latter investors must be r˜A = r˜M + αA where αA < 0 reflects the costs of active
management over the period. Since r˜X first-order stochastically dominates r˜A, no rational
nonsatiated expected utility maximizer, even if risk-seeking, chooses A over X.
Investors may well realize the collective consequences of their individual actions for the
informativeness of security prices and allocation of resources in the real economy, which will
eventually negatively feed into capital market performance, but that is unlikely to overcome
the coordination failure if there is a large number of (anonymous) investors. A swap of X’s
zero alpha for A’s negative alpha is hard to rationalize without heroic assumptions about
preferences and outside investment options. Instead, let us split A into a large number of
active funds. This opens up a Pandora’s box of alpha marketing by their managers as it is
now possible for their subset to achieve positive alpha although it must remain negative in
the aggregate.11 A single active superfund made reality inescapable, suppressing any alpha
dreams. In contrast, a less transparent system of competing professional fund managers may
well attract a substantial number of investors by appealing to their psychological biases and
exploiting the less informed. Awareness raising and learning, however, might undo such effects
and reestablish the dominance of indexing.
2.3 The Art of Piggybacking in Practice
While information acquisition and pricing in some asset markets is of little relevance for social
welfare,12 capital markets are the backbone of market economies and, therefore, dominance
10Throughout, tildes denote random variables. In this example, X perfectly tracks the capitalization-
weighted index of the entire market. For simplicity, the securities and their quantities are the same throughout
the evaluation period. In practice, at least over longer periods, some disappear (bankruptcy, default, maturity),
new ones are issued (IPO, new debt) and the quantities of the existing ones change (seasoned issues, conver-
sions, repurchases, free float adjustments). In such a case, intermediate rebalancing of the market-replicating
portfolio is needed.
11Rational risk seekers would be attracted by the extra active risk.
12See e.g. markets for collectibles, including stamp indices, at www.stanleygibbons.com.
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of informationless strategies might undermine the efficiency of both. How relevant are our
examples in practice?
Due to dynamic changes in the supply of securities, including ‘births’ and ‘deaths’,
and their cross-sectionally as well as temporally varying liquidity, indexers’ free ride is not
smooth. Whenever quantities change,13 indexers are forced to buy/sell individual securities
and sell/buy a slice of the ‘old’ market. Their price impact and other transaction costs then
result in tracking error.14 Some markets are harder to track than others and indexers often
follow only their sufficiently liquid segments. For instance, the total bond market with a large
dynamically changing number of issues and diverse liquidity is harder to replicate than the
total stock market.15 Overall, however, passive benchmark trackers operate mostly with tight
tracking errors and, crucially, at a fraction of active managers’ costs.16
Therefore, as expected, the majority of active managers lag behind their passive coun-
terparts. For instance, Standard & Poor’s (2009, p. 1) reports the performance17 of active
mutual funds as follows:
Over the five year market cycle from 2004 to 2008, S&P 500 outperformed 71.9 % of
actively managed large cap funds, S&P MidCap 400 outperformed 79.1 % of mid cap
funds and S&P SmallCap 600 outperformed 85.5 % of small cap funds. These results
are similar to that of the previous five year cycle from 1999 to 2003. ... Benchmark
indices outperformed a majority of actively managed fixed income funds in all categories
over a five-year horizon. Five year benchmark shortfall ranges from 2-3 % per annum for
municipal bond funds to 1-5 % per annum for investment grade bond funds. ... [I]ndices
outperform[ed] a majority of actively managed non-U.S. equity funds over the past five
years.
Indeed, as many active managers come to terms with their grim reality, they often turn into
so-called ‘closet trackers’. While charging active management fees, they tend to passively
follow the index, expecting nothing, hoping for the best and being prepared for the worst.
Yet, all that does not seem to disturb the great majority of investors on a wild alpha chase.
According to the Investment Company Institute (2009), for instance, the assets in equity index
funds relative to the assets in all equity mutual funds rose from 8.9 % in 1999 to 11.3 % in
2004 to 13 % in 2008. More generally, the data in the report allow us to construct a time series
of the combined assets managed by index funds and ETFs relative to the assets managed by
all mutual funds, closed-end funds (CEFs) and ETFs.18 This approximate measure of explicit
13Unless the supply of all securities changes proportionately or some of them drop out of the market worthless.
14E.g. multiday executions may reduce price impact but at the same time open a back door for tracking
error as market life moves on. To offset some of the transaction costs, indexers often run a securities lending
program. Technically, tracking error is defined by some authors as the difference between portfolio returns and
the corresponding benchmark (index) returns [Black and Litterman (1992), Roll (1992)] but its more usual
definition, embraced by practitioners, is the standard deviation of that difference [Satchell and Hwang (2001)].
Tracking error is also known as ‘active risk’ (for active managers, the former is a misnomer).
15To optimize subject to transaction costs and liquidity constraints, some indexers replace the full replication
approach with stratified sampling, i.e. random selection from predefined subsets (strata) of the market. This
informationless strategy is in line with the EMH as described in Malkiel (2007, p. 24): “[A] blindfolded
monkey throwing darts at a newspaper’s financial pages could select a portfolio that would do just as well as
one carefully selected by the experts.” Sampling is not unbiased if liquidity considerations affect the process.
16If the tracking error is small to negligible, the difference between the index return and a fund return comes
down roughly to the fund’s total expense ratio, i.e. total expenses as a fraction of the assets.
17Adjusted for survivorship bias, net of fees, excluding loads.
18The mutual fund data in the report exclude mutual funds that primarily invest in other mutual funds but
include mutual fund holdings of ETFs and CEFs. Note that such double counting, like closet tracking, could
only reinforce the point we are making.
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indexation by the above US investment companies increased from 6 % in 1999 to 9.1 % in
2004 to 11 % in 2008. The recent growth of index funds and particularly ETFs coincides
with a steady decline in direct holdings by individuals. For instance, French (2008) shows
that approximately 60 % of US stocks were held either directly by individuals or by mutual
funds, CEFs and ETFs between 1999 and 2006. Direct holdings fell from more than a third of
the market to less than a quarter in favour of the investment companies during that period.
Still, such social learning is rather underwhelming and is most likely inhibited by exploitation
of informational asymmetries by the active management industry, both directly and through
the media.
Notably, passive strategies are embraced more by institutional investors. Calculations
based on data provided in French (2008) reveal that about 25 % of the stock market was
held in public/endowment funds and defined benefit/contribution pension plans throughout
the period considered above and about a tenth of the market was steadily under their passive
management. The remaining roughly 15 % of the stock market was in the ownership of
employees, banks, insurance companies and hedge funds. In sum, although exact data are
not available, a conservative estimate is that about a fifth or less of the US stock market has
recently been under (openly) passive management.19
2.4 Limits to Indexing
Historically, capital markets experienced the extreme of universal active management. Could
the other extreme of universal passive management ever occur? Almost certainly not. While
indexing might resemble buying and holding any broadly diversified portfolio, such an ap-
proach usually involves initial strategic security selection.20 In contrast, indexers give up on
any security selection or market timing and strategically delegate price discovery to the rest
of the market, passively rebalancing at the time of index reconstitution. They do not attempt
to beat the market, they want to be the market, whatever the prices.21 Therefore, if all but
one investors were passive, the remaining one would possess pricing power that would allow
her to (actively) buy low and sell high over time while accommodating indexers’ asynchronous
liquidity trading needs.22 If a new security were issued, ceteris paribus, all passive investors
would sell a slice of the ‘old’ market to their active counterpart in order to buy the new
security and the active trader would also buy the residual supply of the latter. At the end
of the day, everybody would hold a slice of the ‘new’ market, after which index trading and
pricing by the active trader would resume. Thus, at the minimum, there are incentives for
the active segment to grow until it becomes competitive.23
That, however, is unlikely to deliver fair pricing in the EMH sense. Trading would be
infrequent, with entire indices typically changing hands, and arrival of new company-specific
19Index funds and ETFs hold predominantly equity while the stock market is considerably smaller than the
bond market in the US. However, paucity of reliable data on institutional investors’ strategies prevents us from
numerically estimating the indexation of the latter.
20This is typical of unit investment trusts rather than index funds or ETFs.
21This does not apply to execution quality as indexers strive to minimize their price impact and time their
trades around index changes to keep tracking error down. In fact, since market makers know that they do not
trade on insider information, indexers are often able to secure preferential prices relative to market bid-ask
spreads. Cf. Kyle (1985).
22By submitting limit orders around some (arbitrary) prices to keep an order-driven market liquid or,
equivalently, by becoming a securities dealer who makes a quote-driven market by setting bid and ask prices.
23In this simplified exposition, as few as two competitors a` la Bertrand might suffice.
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information in the public domain would mostly be followed by no trades at all. More generally,
competition with respect to exploitation of the ovine indexers does not necessarily imply
socially optimal, or any, acquisition of information about fundamental values and its analysis.
Naturally, the theoretical possibility of the blind leading the blind in an information vacuum
is not pertinent to reality. This is because the competitive speculators realize that they
hold an inventory of claims to cash flows, however uncertain and distant in time, and so
some informed valuation of these will always be conducted. The quality of the process is
nevertheless a potential cause of concern.
Even if prices reflected ‘all available information’ according to the EMH, some socially
useful information might never see daylight. It seems quite likely that a rich price formation
process involving multiple informed opinions, especially those of potential long-term holders
of securities, averages out idiosyncratic forecast errors and sends higher-quality information to
the real economy. It is then desirable that there be a relatively large number of sophisticated
investors who actively collect ‘all available information’ and produce new information in the
form of insights about securities for their prices to be fair. Thus, reaching the limits of indexing
seems neither socially optimal nor beneficial for the indexer population. However, maximally
rational24 capital markets provide incentives for investors to index, counterfactually, until
that limit is reached.
3 Investment Skills: Models and Reality
Consider a market in which I fund managers follow buy-and-hold investment strategies over
the time interval [t1, t2]. At time t1, manager i constructs a portfolio of securities worth the
fraction wi of the total market capitalization. Passive managers replicate the market and
incur no costs while active managers conduct security analysis to identify mispricing and
charge active management fees. Then, the following intuitive result holds.
Proposition 1: Let there be a risk-averse investor with preferences over final wealth who
selects a fund manager. Given αi = 0 for indexers,
I∑
i=1
wi · αi ≤ 0 (2)
where αi is defined as the value added by manager i over and above the index as measured by
the
i) expected excess return;
ii) absolute or relative gain in the investor’s expected wealth;
iii) absolute or relative gain in the investor’s expected utility.
Except for the extreme case of universal passive investing, the inequality is strict.
Proof: In the Appendix.
This confirms active portfolio management as a negative-sum alpha contest. It does not
necessarily refer to the market for all existing securities, it can be any segment of it which
constitutes an index. Without further information, whatever the investor’s prior belief about
24I.e. with all participants being rational [Rubinstein (2001)].
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the index performance, there are no rational incentives to pick an active manager who in turn
picks mispriced securities to beat the index. The Appendix explains this in more detail.
Let us consider full trading dynamics. Firstly, (2) holds between any two adjacent trading
points, with the weights and alphas generally varying over time. Even under continuous
trading, as t2 → t1, the constraint must hold over each infinitesimal buy-and-hold period.
Thus, it applies to investors rebalancing quarterly or annually as well as to algorithmic traders,
currently major providers of market liquidity,25 for whom the relevant time period is measured
in microseconds. Secondly, if there are intermediate cash flows in and out of the market,
e.g. due to dividends, repurchases or new issues, the proper benchmark return reflecting
what the average investor earns in the market over any period of time is the dollar-weighted
(internal) rate of return rather than the geometric average of market rates of return over given
subperiods.26 Analogously, at a lower level of aggregation, if a fund experiences intermediate
inflows and outflows, the average return its investors earn over a given period is the dollar-
weighted return. The alternative buy-and-hold return, or the geometric average of fund
returns over given subperiods, only reflects how the initially invested dollar has performed,
irrespective of the timing and magnitude of further flows.
Fund returns often serve as the basis for skills measurement because inflows and outflows
are largely outside of the control of the manager. However, the evaluation of investment skills
is a daunting task whether the manager’s track record is summarized by fund returns or the
dollar-weighted return. If the manager’s mandate restricts her investments to the market(s)
under consideration, she must pick securities based on perceived risk-return characteristics
with any given assets under management and against any active-passive decisions of the other
managers, while those clearly affect her investment opportunity set through (2). For instance,
a skilled manager with superior past returns who is open to new investors may attract strong
flows and experience alpha decay as a consequence of increased wi. Thus, if investors chase
past winners, an upward bias of (positive) alpha estimates needs to be taken into account.
In sum, even if the intellectual abilities of all I managers were constant over time, their
investment skills would most likely be time-varying.
In general, the market is a complex dynamic system riddled with higher-order beliefs and
herding tendencies where profitable strategies lose their glamour sooner rather than later.
Any exploitable profit opportunity is only temporary as proprietary knowledge eventually
leaks. Even the so-called ‘behavioural’ strategies taking advantage of anomalies caused by
investor irrationality eventually become unprofitable as too many investors pursue them in
search for profit, including those irrational investors who have previously created them, thus
chasing their own past errors. While their irrationality will stay, its market manifestation will
continually change. Therefore, investment skills are not fortuitous adherence to a momentarily
successful investment style but the ability to keep ahead of the curve and continually identify
new successful strategies as the old ones die out.
In our framework, the EMH implies that alphas of indexers are zero and alphas of active
traders are negative. However, the reverse implication does not hold although the absence
of (positive) alpha is popularly interpreted as evidence of market efficiency. With equally
(un)skilled active managers, i.e. each of them outsmarting the rest equally often and by
equal amounts, the market would be alpha-free regardless of the amplitude and frequency of
25For instance, Financial Times (2009) reported that high-frequency trading accounted for as much as 73 %
of US daily equity volume.
26Dichev (2007) with Keswani and Stolin (2008) provide empirical evidence on the difference between investor
returns and market returns.
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Figure 1: The S&P 500 stock index since 1975.
oscillation of (disequilibrium) prices around fundamentals. The latter are determined by the
true rational equilibrium asset pricing model that market participants could collectively fail
to implement most of the time, contrary to the EMH,27 thus creating excessive volatility.28
The roller-coaster ride in Figure 1 might well provide an example of that.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), using an ad hoc partial equilibrium model with rational
expectations, make the point that some ‘equilibrium degree of disequilibrium’ is needed so
that those who expend resources to obtain information are compensated.29 However, (2)
implies that such compensation can only come from the presence of exploitable investors,
regardless of how far away from fundamentals prices drift. In a maximally rational market,
such investors would index and no compensation for security analysis and selection would be
possible.
The trillion-dollar30 question is who the exploitable investors are. If there were a large
27Essentially, the EMH proposes that the true asset pricing model in the economy is fed with all available
information efficiently. Thus, the aforementioned joint hypothesis problem implies that model specification
is part and parcel of any empirical test of the EMH, making a stand-alone rejection of the latter practically
impossible. Fama (1970) acknowledges this on p. 384.
28In a statistical/econometric analogy, the market might not act as an efficient estimator of the ‘true’ value
and yet provide little incentive for fundamental trading that would improve the properties of the estimator.
29Inter alia, their uninformed investors do not observe the risky asset supply. We address modern transparent
securities markets which do not have such a feature. Thus, indexers can focus on free ‘quantity discovery’ rather
than costly price discovery.
30E.g. French (2008) estimates that the present value of the costs of active investing in the US stock market
is over 10 % of its current capitalization, which alone roughly corresponds to the stated amount.
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number of unskilled active31 traders constructing their active portfolios randomly and inde-
pendently both in the cross section and over time, they would tend to hold an expensive index
fund in the aggregate, from which sophisticated investors could not draw their alpha. The
latter group can only thrive in the presence of systematic underperformers, i.e. traders who
believe they act independently (and smartly) but do not realize that others know something
about them that they do not know about themselves. For instance, their actions may be
correlated through fads and sentiment, thus possibly allowing sophisticated investors to make
superior picks at their expense.32 The underperformers may be reluctant to learn and admit
the truth about themselves and/or there may, in theory rather than practice, be a steady
arrival of new unsuccessful alpha contestants replacing the old ones who rationally update
their overoptimistic priors and promptly quit.
For instance, individual investors are often presumed to be less skilled than professional
managers. They usually lack expertise, chase styles successful in the past and trade on
infotainment.33 If it is the case, then the aforementioned recent fall in direct investing in
the US stock market in parallel with the growth of index funds and ETFs is likely to have
depressed alphas in the residual active segment of the market.34 If such a trend continues, a
rational response of many sophisticated and previously active investors might be to go passive,
either openly or in a ‘closet’ fashion,35 as the ‘source’ of their own alpha disappears.36 Such
indexing acceleration might bring about price discovery deterioration. The change in the
structure of market participants yet again illustrates how external effects can cause time
variation of alphas of managers with time-invariant intellectual abilities.
Investors can switch between funds and, if we introduce an outside investment opportunity,
they can time the market by moving in and out, hoping to buy low and sell high. Each
investor’s (dollar-weighted) return in the market will typically differ from fund returns, if
only because of idiosyncratic cash flows on account of labour income or liquidity shocks.37
Alternatively, fund picking and switching might be delegated to fund of funds managers and,
similarly, market timing could be conducted by managers with a mandate to invest outside of
the market. In the latter case, however, the principle remains the same. Namely, to maximize
alpha while in the market, which would increase the ‘broader alpha’ defined over the market
and the outside option.
The alpha we have used so far is related to security selection within the market(s) under
consideration. In contrast, pure market timing or tactical asset allocation is equivalent to
31Pure liquidity traders would trade ETFs rather than attempt to pick the most mispriced securities.
32Formally, skilled investors must construct zero-cost portfolios qai , as in (15) in the Appendix, that are
profitable in (true) expectation.
33For example, they often incorrectly interpret ‘hot tips’ from analysts and the media as strategic information
rather than entertainment or, in some cases, manipulation.
34Barras et al. (2010) find that a quarter of US domestic equity mutual funds have statistically significant
negative alpha and the proportion of skilled funds decreased from 14.4 % in 1990 to statistically insignificant
0.6 % in 2006 (ignoring the additional negative effect of loads and taxes).
35Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find a rapid increase in the proportion of closet indexers among US all-equity
mutual funds from the late 1980s to 2003, suggesting that they have only been a relatively recent phenomenon.
36Gruber (1996) suggests that apart from being misled by advertising/broker advice, some investors may be
trapped in underperforming funds for tax reasons or due to pension plan restrictions. However, that does not
explain why future investors should get into such a position in the first place. Indeed, the following one and
a half decades showed a massive surge in index products. Also, informationally disadvantaged retail investors
have been empowered by the internet.
37Throughout, direct investors are simply assumed to be managers of their own single-investor funds.
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dynamic trading of index funds.38 In the latter, the (imperfect) analogy to the passive infor-
mationless approach towards security selection is gradual investing over time to average out
market-timing errors.39 However, in light of the previous discussion regarding the acquisition
and analysis of information about individual issuers, even ‘active’ market timing is likely to
contribute rather superficially to the quality of price discovery since timers of a broad market
focus on macro risks and are most unlikely to conduct continual detailed fundamental anal-
ysis and due diligence of every single issuer. At the extreme, investors may seek exposure
to the entire market in a classical CAPM style and base their periodic consumption/savings
decisions on its long-term historical performance.
3.1 Rational Alpha-Chasing Equilibrium of Berk and Green (2004)
For our purposes, it is necessary to evaluate skills net of expenses. However, some authors
define alpha based on returns gross of expenses, in which case the manager (direct investor) is
considered skilled even if her fees (transaction and opportunity costs) exceed the value added.
In a prominent40 paper, Berk and Green (2004) present a fully rational model with no
information asymmetry in which both mutual fund managers and their investors learn about
the abilities of the former from past observed returns and flows of investor funds compete
away any returns going forward that are expected to exceed the passive benchmark.41 Before
costs, alpha of each manager is constant but since the costs are an increasing strictly convex
function of the assets under management, which is to reflect the increasing difficulty in finding
and, due to price impact, buying undervalued securities, flows of funds towards managers who
turn out to be more skilled reduce the expected investor return to the index return. Similarly,
if investors learn that their fund is underperforming the index, outflows will continue until
the expected investor return matches the index.
The authors thus illustrate that managerial skills are compatible with no persistence in
fund returns and argue that in a rational competitive market, active fund managers are
naturally rewarded for their talents through fees capturing any value added on top of the
index. The motto/subtitle of Berk (2005), promoting Berk and Green (2004), is: “Most
active managers are skilled.” Concretely, their model tells them that with minimum assets
under management, 80 % of managers entering the market are capable of adding value in
excess of the fees charged.
Their story suffers from the following weaknesses. Firstly, their equilibrating mechanism
stands and falls with the presumption that most (and all surviving) managers tend to out-
perform the index before costs/fees are taken off. The more skilled the manager is, the more
assets she attracts and hence the larger the equilibrium amount of profit she generates over
and above the passive alternative. More precisely, the authors work with the parametrization
of 1.5 % for fees and 6.5 % for the average alpha. Managers with alpha below 3 % fail to attract
38This is essentially selection of asset classes in the ‘broader market’ in each subperiod and so Proposition 1
applies to that market. Note, however, that it might not be practically ‘indexable’, e.g. if the outside option
is cash.
39This is obviously less effective in a realistic time frame with exogenous cash flow shocks. Constantinides
(1979) shows that the special case of dollar-cost averaging is suboptimal.
40This paper is singled out because it is one of the best known and most widely cited equilibrium models of
rational performance chasing. As always, only interesting papers are worth a critique and the objective of this
paper is to improve upon the Berk-Green story while acknowledging their contribution.
41They assume that the manager’s portfolio is always of the same risk as the index. (At the end, they briefly
address fund volatility but risk plays no relevant role in the model.)
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enough assets to cover their fixed costs and go out of business. However, by Proposition 1,
seeking alpha is a predatory strategy and their model is silent about who the prey in the
capital market ecosystem is. If all mutual funds are above market average before costs/fees,
then some systematic losers must operate in the background, refusing to take the hint. If that
is the case, then the advertised full rationality of the model is necessarily selective. Secondly,
they ignore the negative effects of active risk on rational risk-averse investors.
Lastly and most importantly, they conclude that “the rational model [is] consistent with
much of the empirical evidence.” (p. 1293) Similarly, Berk (2005, p. 31) argues: “[M]uch
of what we observe about the behavior of actively managed mutual funds is consistent with
a world populated by rational value-maximizing investors who compete with each other.
. . . [R]esearchers . . . have drawn the erroneous conclusion that active managers add little value.
Given the overall levels of manager compensation, one would expect that managers in aggre-
gate should have significant levels of skill and thus add considerable value. . . . [D]ata are in-
deed consistent with many skilled managers who add considerable value but capture this them-
selves in the fees they charge.” However, the empirical evidence on the (under)performance
of active mutual funds presented in Subsection 2.3 indicates quite the opposite. Similarly,
Fama and French (2010) show that the aggregate portfolio of actively managed US equity
mutual funds is close to the market portfolio and so the costs of active management simply
reduce the aggregate returns of their investors relative to the market.
The Berk-Green paradigm is best captured by the corporate finance analogy they use
to motivate their model. In particular, they compare mutual fund managers with corporate
managers searching for positive net present value opportunities in real investments. In both
groups, it is the skilled managers and not the competing suppliers of funds who should capture
the rent on account of scarce skills. However, the active market dynamics is very different
from this story.
Firstly, a good corporate manager will run the business efficiently and may spot market
opportunities that would remain unexploited if she were incompetent, ceteris paribus. Her
superior capital budgeting translates into higher business value without necessarily reducing,
one for one, the value of other businesses. As a group, corporate managers create value and
play a competitive but positive-sum game. In contrast, active fund managers do not create
wealth in the sense that value added to one investor is value taken from another one, irrespec-
tive of whether pricing is fair or not. Price discovery and liquidity, which require a certain
amount of active trading, are externalities that in the medium and long run improve returns
on the index, not on the aggregated zero-cost active portfolios.42 Even if active fund man-
agers represented the highest intellectual calibre the world has to offer, they could easily end
up in a ‘stalemate of the masters’ with all investors paying something for nothing. Secondly,
competition for status is a zero-sum game in any area of life but while it may be rational
to stay a below-average corporate manager (or driver, cook, artist, student, researcher, etc.),
below-average fund managers are not compatible with full rationality because of the freely
available option for investors to become (weakly) above average.
The authors simply assume that fund managers ‘generate’ alpha, thus inviting rational
investors to compete away any free lunch until an equilibrium is established in which managers
are generously rewarded for their productive efforts and talents. This assumption is crucial in
their model in the sense that if it is relaxed, active trading stops. The next section argues for
an alternative paradigm of active trading which involves investor confusion, partly driven by
42Cf. (15) in the Appendix.
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performance manipulation. We believe that it not only better describes the current market
dynamics but also reveals the potential instability of such an incentive structure in practice.
4 The Active-Passive Portfolio Choice in Practice
The central problem any investor faces is how to tell true alpha from false one. The cum-fees
return going forward that manager i delivers is43
r˜i = r˜X + ˜i (3)
and the proportional fee over the same period is fi.
44 As before, we assume for simplicity that
indexers charge fi = 0. Thus, the investor effectively pays the fraction fi of her wealth for
the proportional gamble ˜i. Inherently, this is certain money for a highly uncertain product.
In practice, it may translate into the following problem. The investment committee of a
university endowment fund makes a strategic asset allocation decision based on the university
objectives and the characteristics of major asset classes inferred from historical data, which
results in a billion dollars to be allocated to ‘indexable’ stocks and fixed income instruments.
If, for example, active management costs 30-150 bp more than passive management,45 then
the decision being made is effectively whether to pay 3-15 million dollars per year to active
managers who promise to trade around the relevant indices in such a way that the private46
benefits exceed the costs.
As Section 3 revealed, the rational uninformed prior for ˜i is a fair gamble loaded with
pure active risk. Therefore, the committee members must possess credible information Ψ that
makes ˜i|Ψ more favourable and justifies their decision to pay fi. Typically, Ψ contains the
track record of the manager(s) as summarized by past returns and assets under management,
possibly including detailed portfolio allocations, and stated investment strategies going for-
ward. The committee members then have the unenviable task to model, whether formally or
simply in their minds, the nonstationary social processes in the active segment of the market
and try to forecast managerial alpha over the coming investment period.
This is where the issue of fiduciary responsibility arises. Star managers who tend to come
out as winners from the negative-sum alpha contests can be viewed as a desirable addition
to the universe of all available assets in the sense that their human capital enables profitable
exploitation of disequilibria in the market for the other assets. It is, therefore, legitimate to
seek them. At the same time, however, verification and monitoring of the quality of their in-
vestment process are challenging at best. Importantly, rational active investing is conditional
on bounded rationality of some other market participants and so Ψ must necessarily involve
information on that.
4.1 Complexity and Alpha Illusion
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how seemingly minor errors made by investors
in a complex environment can have a profound impact on the market landscape and, para-
43Note that ˜i corresponds to the last term in (17) in the Appendix.
44All possible fees are expressed as a fraction of the initial wealth paid at the end of the period.
45In practice, the latter can be expected below 10 bp for large institutional investors.
46While price discovery and liquidity that active management produces may be public goods, the university,
alumni donors, benefactors and other stakeholders certainly do not wish to pay for it, if only because education,
research and leadership that the university produces serve the public good no less. Generally, the structure of
investor incentives is summarized by the title of Subsection 2.2.
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doxically, keep the price discovery process alive. Managerial ability is no less difficult to
establish than misvaluation of securities in the market and before costs, delegation of active
portfolio management is merely a switch from one zero-sum game to another. However, while
the former is supposed to be played by professionals, the latter is played largely by amateurs.
Curiously, the latter investors implicitly assume the role of experts on selecting experts whose
expertise they usually do not have and can therefore verify with only limited confidence.47
Thus, complexity is on the side of the managers, advisers and marketeers. We shall now
explore some basic techniques and strategies of sophisticated investment companies and their
managers that can, intentionally or inadvertently, impede alpha learning by unsophisticated
investors.
4.1.1 Incubation and Strategic Closures
Consider an active fund and let At be its net asset value (NAV) per share at time t, i.e. the
ex -fees value of a dollar invested in the fund at its inception. Let Xt be the corresponding
value of a dollar invested in the market index at the same time. The total performance index
of the active manager is then
at ≡ At
Xt
. (4)
The fund management company institutes a shutdown rule for its funds to prevent excessive
losses and shed the worst underperformers. Moreover, investors react to certain patterns in
performance and once its medium-term deterioration hits their tolerance threshold, the fund
again folds and the manager is fired or, if it can pacify a sufficient proportion of investors, she
may be replaced by a new manager with a stellar track record. In the case of discontinuation,
the fund is liquidated and its shareholders receive cash redemptions or, subject to their
approval, it may be merged with a more successful fund from the same fund family.
While the shutdown rule reflects a natural effort of the fund management company to
identify and select the best talent, it often involves deliberate incubation of artificial star
performers capable of attracting strong flows and thus generating profits through fees.48 The
company sets up a large number of small funds, provides them with seed capital and lets
them operate for some time, possibly a few years, out of public sight. After that, it starts
to advertise the successful ones aggressively and, being the principal shareholder, shuts down
the rest. Before the culling, the company may boost the performance of incubator funds
through cross-subsidization within the fund family by means of preferential distribution of
fees and allocation of underpriced IPOs, often from investment banks having soft dollar
arrangements49 with large funds from the same family. While funds continue to drop out in the
post-incubation period and the resulting survivorship bias keeps increasing with managerial
tenure, incubation can render it especially severe as the fund management company can
47In practice, there is an additional (expensive) layer of managers who specialize in picking star funds for
their funds of funds. Then, the investor only needs to become an expert on selecting experts on selecting
experts. Unsurprisingly, there exist e.g. funds of funds of hedge funds, the so-called F3s, with triple-layer fees.
48The ethical aspects of this practice in the mutual fund industry are addressed by Ackermann and Loughran
(2007) or Palmiter and Taha (2009). The latter provide technical details of the incubation process and its
regulatory limits. Evans (2010) estimates that almost a quarter of US domestic equity mutual funds between
1996 and 2005 were incubated, their incubation performance exceeded that of young non-incubated funds by
3.5 % p.a. on a risk-adjusted basis and the outperformance vanished after they hatched.
49This involves excess commissions to broker-dealers in exchange for additional services and favours, such
as research or ‘hot’ IPO allocations.
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manufacture ‘alpha’ in a Monte Carlo fashion with little risk to the reputation of the fund
family.50
Let us consider managers who have no investment skills and, their efforts notwithstand-
ing, end up constructing dadaistic portfolios that are equivalent to random collections of
securities.51 Then, we can model their investment process as
dA
A
=
dX
X
− f · dt+ σ · dW (5)
where
dX
X
= µX · dt+ σX · dWX , (6)
dW · dWX = 0, i.e. W and WX are uncorrelated standard Wiener processes, and f denotes
fees as a fraction of net assets under management. By Itoˆ’s Lemma, we obtain the process
for the performance index
da
a
= −f · dt+ σ · dW. (7)
If there is no incubation, a0 = 1. If, on the other hand, the fund incubated for period κ, then
the truly initial condition is a−κ = 1 and assuming the investment process under incubation
follows (5) with the post-incubation parameters (−f, σ) replaced by (µκ, σκ), we obtain52
a0 ∼ logN
[(
µκ − σ
2
κ
2
)
· κ, σ2κ · κ
]
. (8)
Cross-subsidization leads to µκ > −f .
Investors do not observe funds under incubation but the track records of those hatched
become observable in retrospect and are backfilled into relevant databases. What investors
see is
a∗T ≡ at|Θt (9)
where T = t+ κ ≥ κ is the manager’s tenure and Θt conditions on the development of the
process a on [0, t]. Defining the running minimum of the process as
at = min
s∈[0,t]
as, (10)
we can state the following result.
50In the lightly regulated alternative investment industry, hedge fund incubators are frequently set up to
help managers establish an attractive track record using their personal capital. Those who succeed have their
performance records audited and can begin to legally market their newly created funds to potential outside
investors. If a hedge fund seeding company/incubator (effectively a multi-manager hedge fund or a fund of
hedge funds) distributes seed capital across a number of managers in return for a share of their future fee
income (on top of the seed investment income), its losses on unsuccessful managers are often covered multiple
times by the profits resulting from flows to successful ones. Regarding the demand for seed capital, e.g.
Financial Times (2008) quoted the COO of the incubation arm of a major fund of funds operator as saying:
“We’re seeing a lot more investment opportunities than we’d expected. When we started out, we expected to
maybe see 200 managers a year. We now expect to see between 500 and 1,000 this year.”
51Obtained through effectively random draws of qai in (15) in the Appendix.
52There is a simpler and less risky way to boost the initial track record. For instance, two managers may
hold the index and, on top of that, enter opposite index futures positions. At the end of the incubation period,
the unlucky fund is discontinued and the managers jointly launch the successful one. In such a case, a0 > 1
almost surely. However, incubation does not necessarily involve such scheming and may be genuinely perceived
as a competitive selection process by many participants. We model the latter.
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Proposition 2: Let the shutdown rule imply
Θt = {a0 ≥ c0, at > c} (11)
where c0 and c are constants such that c0 > c > 0. Then, the density of a
∗
T is given by
fa∗T (â|c0, c) =
Φ [ξ1 (â, c0)]− ξ2 (â, c) · Φ [ξ3 (â, c0, c)](
1− P†t
)
· ξ4 (â) · Φ [ξ5 (c0)]
(12)
for â > c and zero otherwise, where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function
and the auxiliary functions ξ1, . . . , ξ5 as well as P†t , the probability of a post-incubation closure
by time t, are given in the Appendix.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Thus, if only those managers whose performance index equals at least c0 at the end of the
incubation period go public and if they go out of business once their performance index falls
to the critical level c afterwards, we can easily contrast the performance density of survivors
of a given tenure with the corresponding density implied by the true performance process.
Also, we can obtain the proportion of the survivors outperforming the index.53
Figure 2 shows the results obtained under the following assumptions. Under incuba-
tion, µκ = 0 through cross-subsidization and relatively risky incubation strategies lead to
σκ = 15 %. Incubator funds take off only if they outperform the index at the end of their
one-year testing period.54 Fees are 1 % of the net assets under management and σ = 8 %.55
Once the total performance of a manager falls short of the index by 22.5 %, she goes out of
business.
As a result, incubator funds face a 53% termination probability. The bottom right graph
plots P†t , the probability that a manager is forced out of business by a given post-incubation
date, and contrasts it with the corresponding probability in the no-incubation scenario in
which a0 = 1. According to Malkiel and Saha (2005), the annual rate of attrition among US
mutual funds in 1994-2003 was mostly 5-8 %. Similarly, Standard & Poor’s (2009) reports
that only 73.37 % of US domestic equity mutual funds survived their performance evaluation
period 2004-2008. The attrition in our no-incubation scenario is slightly less than the above,
with e.g. the 5-year survival probability being 75 %. Moreover, mortality falls substantially
in the incubation scenario (assuming the same c) and so in a population of incubated and
nonincubated funds, the survival rate would be between the two.
While not all closures are necessarily performance-related, few in the majority that are take
place because of success, especially in the first several years of the fund’s existence. Therefore,
our simplified shutdown rule may well provide a realistic, albeit crude, approximation of the
selection process in the mutual fund industry.56 Most importantly, the purpose of this exercise
is to illustrate that if investors and unsophisticated experts make the relatively innocent error
of relying on the visible and ignoring the largely invisible, it is sufficient to make them believe
in the superiority of active portfolio management in general and/or in their own ability to
find a skilled manager.
53Using quadrature.
54In practice, longer incubation periods enable marketing selected funds based on their string of annual
successes. On the other hand, it involves greater time costs and career risks for the managers.
55By (5) and (6), the net asset value A per share follows a geometric Brownian motion with the volatility
parameter σA = (σ
2
X + σ
2)1/2. For instance, σA = 17 % under the realistic assumption of σX = 15 %.
56The concept of survival in general is analyzed by Brown et al. (1995).
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Figure 2: Survivors’ vs. true performance process. The top graph’s horizontal and vertical
axes are 100 · (â− 1) and f(â), respectively, where f denotes the densities of a∗6 (κ = 1),
a∗5 (κ ↓ 0) and a5; the legend also applies to the bottom left graph. Parameters: f = 0.01,
σ = 0.08, c0 = 1, c = 0.775 and µκ = 0. If incubated, σκ = 0.15. If not, σκ ↓ 0.
The top graph juxtaposes the performance density of survivors after 5 years of public
existence with the density of the underlying performance process (7) started at t = 0 with
a0 = 1. It also demonstrates how aggressive incubation can make a lasting impact on the total
performance of a manager/fund and perpetuate the aforementioned belief that overall, active
managers tend to beat indexers.57 The bottom left graph indeed shows that in a population
consisting of incubated and nonincubated funds, the majority of surviving managers appear
to be beating the index over their career. Thus, it is possible for a fund management company
to operate a large number of funds with mortality not exceeding that of the overall market
such that to the naive eye, most of its managers appear to deliver positive alpha even if it is
negative in reality.58
In addition, let us note that the distribution of survivors’ performance exhibits high posi-
tive skewness, which may be an attractive feature per se, although the skewness of the true per-
formance process is substantially lower. For instance, if investors have Cumulative Prospect
57The more recent performance of such funds will tend to be worse than the total performance. However, the
latter may well bias the overall expectations of naive investors upwards, especially if advertising of such funds
stresses the geometric average of fund returns rather than the dollar-weighted return as assets grow due to
new inflows. Since incubator funds start small and attract public flows only if successful, the incubation effect
may be naively misinterpreted as the size effect reducing the investment opportunities of a talented manager.
58If σ goes up, i.e. the tracking error rises, and/or c is increased, mortality grows while the performance of
survivors improves, and vice versa.
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Theory preferences as in Barberis and Huang (2008) or form optimal beliefs/expectations as
in Brunnermeier et al. (2007), the extra skewness may further raise their perceived value of
active portfolio management. There may be a variety of psychological biases in the investor
population that are hard to model and test empirically. Animal spirits may well be the major
driver of market activity. Overconfidence may bring many investors to active trading and
biased self-attribution, coupled with wishful thinking, may keep them there much longer than
would be expected from a rational learner who has the option to index.
We stress a single prominent aspect of delegated portfolio management that may serve
as a basis for such biases, of which the supply side takes strategic advantage and which may
in itself be sufficient to explain why so many investors seem to miss the fine point made by
Proposition 1. Considering that survivorship bias was for a long time ignored in empirical
studies by scientists,59 it is perhaps not surprising that this might still be a major source of
confusion among less sophisticated investors.
So far, we have considered the performance process of managers who effectively trade on
noise. If there exist systematically skilled managers, they would tend to fail less frequently
and, conversely, their systematically unskilled counterparts would tend to disappear more
frequently. The troubling aspect of searching for alpha is that even if investors managed to
perfectly correct for the incubation and survivorship bias, which is not always possible in
reality, a quarter of noise-trading managers are still beating the index after 15 years, which
exceeds the lifetime of a majority of funds.60 Adjustment for higher volatility would reduce
the proportion of alpha candidates but in general, allowing for time variation of alpha as
discussed in Section 3, there is little hope for meaningful statistical analysis of performance
using time series of typical length or, alternatively, the estimation risks would mostly run too
high for rational decision makers unless they face a truly exceptional track record.
4.1.2 Peso Problem Engineering
While some managers maximize returns relative to a benchmark index, others follow absolute
return strategies which aim to deliver returns in excess of the riskfree rate in bull and bear
markets alike. This is particularly the case of many hedge funds.61 Such zero-beta strategies
are supposed to deliver ‘portable alpha’,62 i.e. a welcome addition to one’s overall portfolio
that brings superior returns without increasing exposure to the market or other major risk
factors. Thus, instead of a traditional active mutual fund, the investor might buy an index
fund and add portable alpha on top of that.
Conceptually, however, there is little difference from nonzero-beta strategies that claim
to deliver alpha, especially if portable alpha comes from positions in the same market. For
instance, the so-called 130/30 strategy63 now employed by some mutual funds combines the
index with a long/short portfolio promising to deliver portable alpha. The total portfolio sat-
isfies (15) in the Appendix and so Proposition 1 places restrictions on the sign and magnitude
of such alphas across the market.64
59For details, see Elton et al. (1996).
60After 5 years, 64.4 % of the managers underperform the index and it becomes 69.5 % if f = 1.5 %. Note
that this is still less than the realized underperformance of active mutual funds reported in Subsection 2.3.
61The term is largely a misnomer, however, since a lot of hedge funds today pursue directional strategies.
62See Kung and Pohlman (2004).
63This combines exposure to the index with short and long positions each worth 30 % of the portfolio. Such
strategies are generalized as 1X0/X0 with X being a single-digit number.
64Thus, the above example with a university endowment fund carries over if it e.g. combines allocations to
20
Moreover, the typically opaque nature of hedge funds exacerbates the informational asym-
metry between managers and investors, of which the former may take advantage to boost their
performance record and attract/retain capital through the Peso Problem65 engineering, i.e.
entering into positions with a high probability of (smaller) success and a low probability of
(large) failure. Since occurrence of the rare event usually ends the manager’s career (with the
current fund), the surviving population consists of managers with improved track record on
account of this practice even though they add no value if the securities are fairly priced. The
option-like structure of the manager’s compensation (limited liability, absence of clawback
provisions) may often make such a strategy tempting since it translates into a high probabil-
ity of superior income and a low probability of positive income from the outside employment
option.
Brown et al. (1999) and Malkiel and Saha (2005) raise the point that the annual attrition
rate among hedge funds seems to be about 15-20 %. Figure 3 shows the typical profile of
survivors engineering the Peso Problem in a high-mortality environment. The results are
obtained by writing index option strangles priced by the Black-Scholes-Merton formula but
should be generally viewed as a result of a wide range of intrinsically similar and largely
independent strategies such as statistical ‘arbitrage’ (pair trading), merger ‘arbitrage’, fixed
income ‘arbitrage’, etc.66
Margin requirements impose a maximum on the number of options the manager can write
and in the simulations, the manager exploits only about a third of the maximum during
incubation and half of it post-incubation. Therefore, the highest ex -fees performance in the
figure should not be viewed as the limit such strategies can deliver. Quite on the contrary, the
manager could collect much more premium (or convert cash into higher-yielding assets) and
substantially improve the overall performance in the luckiest states. On the other hand, she
would then increase the frequency of forced intermediate liquidations when unable to meet
margin calls, which would reshape the distributions.
Formally, the total performance index of the manager is
at ≡ At · e−r·(t+κ) (13)
and the now extended shutdown rule implies
Θt = {a0 ≥ c0, at > c, aHt > cH} (14)
where aHt = At/Ht in which Ht is the year-end level of the NAV that needs to be attained
for at least some performance fees to be paid out and cH > 0 is the level of aHt at which
the fund is closed down.67 More formal details are in the Appendix and what follows is a
summary of the problem.
long-only equity funds and long/short equity hedge funds.
65See e.g. Krasker (1980) or Veronesi (2004). The now generic term refers to what seemed for a long time
like market inefficiency inviting for carry trade between the Mexican peso and the US dollar, until one day
in 1976 the out-of-sample tail risk of a sizable peso devaluation finally entered in the sample, wiping out the
previous steady gains.
66In theory, arbitrage involves zero risk of loss and positive probability of profit. In practice, these charac-
teristics are usually not satisfied but the term is still used if it generates abnormal risk-adjusted returns. Such
‘arbitrage’ is in the eye of the beholder. What one interprets as underrated high-yield bonds may be seen as
the Peso Problem by others.
67This reflects the practical observation that hedge fund managers ‘deep under water’ have incentives to
close down and open a new fund.
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Figure 3: Survivors’ vs. true performance process. The distributions of 100 · (a˜− 1) with
a˜ = a∗6 (top left; κ = 1), a˜ = a∗5 (top right; κ = 0) and a˜ = a5 (bottom left) are plotted
as histograms with bins 1 percentage point wide. Parameters: d = 1/252, r = fM = 1 %,
fP = 10 %, k = 2.85, ν = 1/2, kκ = 1.35, νκ = 0.36, c = 3/4 and cH = 2/3. 1,000,000 index
trajectories were randomly generated with 2 · µX = σX = 15 %. Details in the Appendix.
The manager has an underlying position in cash or cash equivalents such as T-bills. First,
she structures an incubation bet on the index which has a 50% probability of being correct
and survives her one-year trial period only if all the shorted options in the fund’s portfolio
expire worthless. In such a case, she emerges publicly with a 16% return for the previous
year, advertising a 15% ‘alpha’ given the riskfree rate of 1 %. Then, at the start of each year,
she writes options that expire worthless at the end of the year with the probability of almost
85 %. The management fee is 1 % of the NAV and in addition, the manager charges a 10%
performance fee on the fund’s return over and above the riskfree rate, taking the high-water
mark of year-end NAVs as the basis for its calculation. The fund folds if the NAV falls short
of a cash position by a quarter or if it falls short of the hurdle for performance fees by a third.
The figure illustrates with striking clarity how survival of the fittest can be observation-
ally equivalent to survival of the luckiest.68 Note that survivors will generally exhibit little
68Just like before, fund closures effectively serve as a ‘stop loss’ on the true process. Success is visible,
failure less so, especially if there is limited communication among investors of folded funds. In addition to
the incubation bias at the start of their life cycle, hedge funds do not have to report the liquidation value
at the end of the life cycle and so our knowledge of the severity of ‘blow-ups’ in the industry is limited. To
keep the door open for a new hedge fund, managers attempt to frame liquidations positively as the ‘best
wealth-preserving action in an unprecedented situation’. There is no comprehensive hedge fund database that
would allow unbiased evaluation of the industry’s past performance and so, unfortunately, any empirical study
is only well-intentioned guesswork.
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correlation with the index and the track record of the large proportion of best performers in
particular will show practically no volatility. This all may create the impression of portable
alpha. However, what naive investors using static risk measurement techniques often perceive
as near-zero beta is in fact ‘asymmetric beta’ which is, in absolute value, low in most states
but very high in others due to nonlinear option-like payoffs of this type of strategies. Or
it may generally be ‘alternative beta’ of an omitted risk factor. In a high-attrition world
with the average managerial tenure close to the average time to extreme events, investors are
largely in the dark.
The manager can adopt highly complex strategies and as long as marketing manages to be
economical with the truth about the underlying investment process, unsuspecting investors
may be attracted by in-sample performance, thus buying an out-of-sample disaster since such
funds often operate as catastrophic risk insurers.69 The fact that some sophisticated investors
and academics70 are well aware of performance manipulation techniques does not preclude
the majority of less sophisticated investors from failing to detect them. In contrast, rational
investors who wish to add such a payoff structure to their portfolio will obtain it through
passive exposure and increase it by the amount of saved hedge fund fees. Indeed, recently
there has been a movement towards passive replication of hedge fund strategies.71
Protection of proprietary trading strategies characteristic of the hedge fund industry re-
duces transparency and introduces risks of performance manipulation on top of the active
trading risks discussed previously.72 Consequently, rational investors will demand extra opac-
ity premium, which further reduces ‘aggregate alpha’, thus constituting an additional incentive
for them not to go active within ‘indexable’ markets and, instead, obtain (leveraged) index
exposure involving no active management and performance fees. The recent rise of innovative
investment vehicles specially designed for the latter therefore greatly facilitates rationaliza-
tion of portfolio choice. Managers who are (momentarily) truly skilled may find it difficult
to credibly differentiate themselves from the high-turnover mass of their lucky naive and/or
opportunistic counterparts.
Note that the Peso Problem has been used in the literature to argue that some rational
models fail to fit the observed reality because rational individuals are not fooled by the sample
and expect catastrophic events that have not materialized yet,73 while here it supports the
argument that reality fails to fit the rational model because many boundedly rational investors
are fooled by the sample.
In general, we present a behavioural alternative to rational alpha-chasing models, arguing
that investors tend to suffer from ‘aggregate alpha illusion’. Minor errors on the part of
nonexperts and less sophisticated professionals making nontrivial investment decisions can be
a major driver of active trading on information. At the same time, however, such activity is
not robust to learning, enhanced consumer protection and improved risk management rules
for institutional investors. The simplicity of the argument for indexing may well accelerate the
recent trend towards passive informationless investing, thus undermining socially beneficial
69Similarly to ‘closet trackers’, they hope to go unnoticed for as long as possible and charge fees.
70See Lo (2001), Weisman (2002), Goetzmann et al. (2007) or Foster and Young (2008, 2009). The latter
show that returns-based contracts separating truly skilled managers from their mimics are impossible to design
under a ‘black-box’ investment process.
71See Jaeger and Wagner (2005).
72Even with full portfolio disclosure, performance-manipulating managers could employ dynamic trading
strategies that replicate option payoffs but elude investors without deep expertise in the area [Lo (2001)]. Or,
in line with footnote 66, managers can always claim that they short options because they are overpriced.
73See e.g. Rietz (1988).
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price discovery.
5 Discussion and Policy Recommendations
Even if financial markets did operate efficiently in the past, a (desirable) universal increase
in financial literacy and (correct) appeals of index fund groups to investor rationality might
bring about a gradual paradigm shift resulting in invalidation of previous empirical findings,
poorer price discovery and insufficient liquidity. No less importantly, ever-increasing passive
ownership of the economy’s productive capacities could put a strain on the efficiency of
corporate governance. Overall, the relative merits of market-based and bank-based financial
systems would be rewritten.74
Should open and ‘closet’ indexers become the dominant market force and marginalize
fundamental investors, relative pricing of securities would tend to deteriorate in quality.75
Also, informationless flows of funds in and out of the market would have the tendency to
inflate and deflate the overall price level with relatively little regard for fundamentals. The
remaining active segment might not be able or willing to correct that. For instance, given
practical limits of arbitrage, sophisticated investors who become aware of a forming bubble
may find it rational to withdraw from the market altogether rather than resort to uncertain
shorting strategies or, alternatively, they may strategically ride the bubble with the hope of a
timely exit.76 While it is possible to attract liquidity to the market,77 it is not so with price
discovery for obvious verification reasons.
Therefore, despite large uncertainty about relevant social costs and benefits, it seems pru-
dent that public policies implementing the social therapy to moderate widespread alpha chas-
ing should be designed in a two-way fashion. On the one hand, targeted financial education
should provide low/middle-income individuals, university endowment funds and charitable
foundations with unbiased information about the true nature and historical record of active
management strategies and, for instance, retirement plans should be legally obliged to pro-
vide low-cost index funds as a default option.78 Since stakes are high, more transparency and
accountability is needed in the process of delegated portfolio management. While individual
investors are free to take the personal risks associated with alpha bets, agents in charge of
institutional investors should have clearly defined fiduciary duties protecting the principals
and the reasons behind the choice of an active manager operating in an ‘indexable’ market
should be subject to scrutiny.
In general, gullibility of vulnerable groups in the population should be reduced by rais-
ing awareness of the role of chance, including statistical (in)significance of alpha estimates
based on time series of typical length, and the presence of a strong survivorship bias. In
particular, it is important to reveal and intensively popularize the techniques used by the ac-
tive management industry to market its alpha through the introduction of favourable biases
74For a review, see Levine (2002).
75Woolley and Bird (2003) offer a concrete case study of such mispricing due to captive demand coming
from indexers and ‘tight trackers’.
76By a dictum attributed to Keynes, “the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.” See
e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) or Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
77For instance, liquidity rebates have recently been paid by exchanges to active traders supplying liquidity,
effectively charging those who demand it. See Financial Times (2009).
78The latter is in line with the broader public policy approach ‘Nudge’ as proposed by Thaler and Sunstein
(2008).
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into traditional/intuitive performance measures. The bulk of the requisite enlightenment is
likely to come directly from the index fund industry, independent financial advisors and in-
dependent media. However, there is room for greater involvement of securities and exchange
commissions, central banks and other government agencies as well as the broader educational
system in the process. Most likely, the effect of such a public contribution to the exposition
of alpha marketing tricks would be magnified through further dissemination of any relevant
material by the aforementioned private channels.
On the other hand, provided that adequate regulatory and supervisory standards exist
and financial stability concerns are addressed, policymakers should embrace a laissez-jouer
approach79 towards high net worth individuals80 and other entities willing and able to bear,
on a strictly private basis, the inherent costs and risks of the negative-sum alpha contests. As
long as the latter parties do not seek to externalize such internalities through moral hazard
vis-a`-vis shareholders or taxpayers, such a solution seems efficient in the broader social sense
and incentive-compatible from the perspective of political economy. Although the active
management industry may resemble a casino internally, there is necessarily a moment at
which it serves as a utility externally. Besides its crucial allocative role, the capital market
may have a major impact on macroeconomic volatility and so the quality of the signals it
transmits to the wider economy is of primary importance to policymakers.
Should passive investing come to dominate the market overwhelmingly at some point,
the resulting poor acquisition and analysis of information coupled with low liquidity would
most likely pose a greater threat to social welfare than excessive acquisition and analysis of
information financed by those who stand ready, by revealed preference, to absorb potential
losses from such activity. For instance, there are likely to be nonnegligible social benefits in
having an industry of systemically unimportant81 benchmark-unrestricted hedge funds that
readily assume informed leveraged and short positions in individual securities as well as entire
asset classes and strategic policymaking should, at the minimum, erect no barrier to entry of
qualified investors.
The economic literature labels several empirical phenomena that do not square with the
‘homo oeconomicus’ model as ‘puzzles’. If that is the criterion, then the dominance of active
trading in capital markets deserves its place on the list. Regarding its complete disappearance,
however, we should be careful what we wish for, lest it come true.
6 Conclusion
Alas, there seems to be no invisible hand leading capital market participants towards socially
optimal acquisition of raw information and production of new information about security
issuers, considerable uncertainty regarding the actual optimum notwithstanding. In a classical
coordination problem, the passive/active ratio may drift up indefinitely with little regard for
social consequences. The notion that at some point active management suddenly becomes
more attractive due to market inefficiency is a fallacy.
79I.e. a ‘let-them-play’ policy.
80Some may enjoy investing for its own sake, perhaps being rationally risk-seeking above a certain wealth
level or perceiving hedge fund investing as a status symbol.
81Apart from precluding moral hazard, this increases competition in information acquisition and its analysis.
Efficiency should not be compromised as economies of scale are likely to be exhausted long before a fund
becomes systemically important.
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Whatever the prior beliefs of investors about the performance of a particular market
index, they unconditionally view active management as a costly fair gamble on top of that,
i.e. favouring alpha products over beta products is a strategy minimizing risk-adjusted returns
irrespective of price inefficiencies. Such an undesirable incentive structure is the downside of
modern transparent organized markets with relatively slow variation in the securities supply.
We argue that models a` la Berk and Green (2004) incorrectly rationalize the active man-
agement sector and do not promote our understanding of the true nature of market activity.
This has important implications not only for practical portfolio allocation but also for any
prospect of informed policymaking. In search for a more realistic paradigm of active trading,
we provide a model illustrating that if investors overweigh the characteristics of survivors
and underestimate the effect of natural and strategic closures, such a relatively minor error
may be sufficient to make them sway towards active management, which they would probably
not do if properly instructed. This insight implies a very fragile incentive structure as it is
now easier than ever before for both individual and institutional investors to optimize their
investment decisions.
Despite the complexity of capital markets, the argument for indexing is simple and pow-
erful. While policymakers could push the passive/active ratio further up with the stroke of a
pen,82 they cannot stop or reverse its recent upward trend. Economists may agree that active
investors tend to overtrade83 and more long-term fundamental investing based on security
analysis, without excessive trading, would be preferable. However, passive informationless
investing is very different from that.
We do not observe the quality of price discovery and cannot easily measure it, since we do
not know what the underlying fundamental values are. If we did, we might as well be living in
a world with no history of a spectacular failure of central planning, which goes back to Hayek
(1945). However, even in its abstract form, the argument that dwindling participation in the
search for fundamentals in capital markets will ultimately produce less precise information
about security issuers seems compelling. The ‘wisdom of the crowd’ is likely to be superior
to the ‘wisdom of a few’ and when fundamental investors become indexers, price discovery
will suffer.
Following the burst of the technological bubble of the 1990s and the financial crisis of the
late 2000s, there have been concerns about the ability of capital markets to conduct efficient
price level discovery. Figure 1 illustrates why. If indexing becomes prevalent, further concerns
regarding the efficiency of relative price discovery are likely to arise. Defenders of efficient
markets often invoke rationality behind price formation. Yet, paradoxically, increased investor
rationality might well render markets less efficient.84
Indeed, this may be viewed as a broader issue touching the heart of economics. For
instance, rational schools of thought argue quite convincingly about the ineffectiveness of
macroeconomic policies which are implicitly based on the presumption that active macroeco-
82E.g. via default passive pension plans or, with aggressive paternalism, by requiring mutual fund investors
to sign information sheets clearly explaining their choices.
83See e.g. Odean (1999). Generally, most active investors probably trade on noise in the sense of Black
(1986), thus keeping markets liquid.
84Whether residual active traders supplying liquidity to the market would necessarily provide efficient discov-
ery of fundamental values is perhaps answered by Jim Simons of Renaissance Technologies, the famously suc-
cessful multi-billion-dollar hedge fund manager specializing in algorithmic trading: “We hire physicists, math-
ematicians, astronomers and computer scientists and they typically know nothing about finance.” [Reuters
(2007)] It makes little difference that the active/passive ratio in terms of daily volume is higher than in terms
of holdings due to such trading.
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nomic management can fool people over and over again. Yet, the very same economists are
often staunch defenders of the EMH, implying that active asset management has been doing
precisely that for decades, adding no value but subtracting fees on the way. While the relative
significance of such errors may be subject to debate, the inherent inconsistencies carried by
such joint propositions are far from negligible and deserve ‘joint attention’.
Whether indexing manages to gradually transform capital markets in the coming years
is yet to be seen but it is obvious that the current market dynamics need not be robust
against social learning or more broadly defined innovation diffusion, and the innovative index
products might eventually become standard. Young (2009) shows possible adoption dynamics
resulting from such social processes and we know from history that even simple ideas may
take surprisingly long to be embraced, rational incentives notwithstanding.85 This is an
important issue for policymakers as well as an interesting avenue for academic research, since
price discovery in capital markets is central to the efficiency of the real economy. Should the
proverbial pendulum, as a result of increased rationality of individual decisions, swing from
current hyperactivity to hyperpassivity, capital markets would not be what they used to be,
for better and worse.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof and Explanation of Proposition 1
At time t1, the total market supply of securities is Q =
∑I
i=1 qi, their prices are P > 0 and
the portfolio of each investor can be expressed as
qi = wi ·Q+ qai (15)
where
wi =
P ′ · qi
P ′ ·Q ∈ (0, 1] (16)
is the value of the portfolio as a fraction of total market capitalization, with
∑I
i=1wi = 1.
Thus, the investor’s portfolio can be viewed as a combination of a passive portfolio and a
zero-cost active portfolio, the first and the second term in (15), respectively. P ′ · qai = 0
follows immediately from (15) and (16).86
The rate of return on portfolio i over the time interval [t1, t2] is then
r˜i =
P˜ ′ · qi
P ′ · qi − 1 =
[
P˜ ′ ·Q
P ′ ·Q − 1
]
+
P˜ ′ · qai
P ′ · qi , (17)
with P˜ denoting prices at t2 and the bracketed expression being the market index return r˜X .
It follows from (15) that
∑I
i=1 q
a
i = 0 and so (17) gives
r˜X =
I∑
i=1
wi · r˜i. (18)
85For example, whether effective in overcoming agency problems or not, stock options as part of execu-
tive compensation in large corporations grew steadily from near nonexistence in the 1940s to overwhelming
prevalence at the turn of the century. See Frydman and Saks (2010).
86For indexers, qai = 0. For active investors, some elements of the vector are necessarily negative, which
means short positions, possibly so large that qi too involves short positions.
27
i) Taking the expectation of (18) and defining αi ≤ E(r˜i − r˜X) gives (2).
ii) This follows immediately if u is defined as linear in iii).
iii) At t1, the investor has wealth W ≤ mini{wi} · P ′ ·Q which she invests in the market
and may have additional nonmarket wealth N . At t2, those become W˜i = W · (1 + r˜i)
and N˜ . She has preferences over N˜ + W˜i represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function u such that u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. (18) implies W˜X =
∑I
i=1wi · W˜i and so
by Jensen’s inequality,
Eu
(
N˜ + W˜X
)
= Eu
[
I∑
i=1
wi ·
(
N˜ + W˜i
)]
≥
I∑
i=1
wi · Eu
(
N˜ + W˜i
)
. (19)
Rearranging,
∑I
i=1wi ·
[
Eu
(
N˜ + W˜i
)
− Eu
(
N˜ + W˜X
)]
≤ 0. The absolute changes in
the brackets turn into relative changes after dividing through by Eu
(
N˜ + W˜X
)
> 0.87
Then, defining αi as weakly smaller than the corresponding bracketed expression gives
(2).
Index funds deliver r˜i = r˜X to investors and so their αi = 0. Because of fees, active managers
pass strictly less than r˜i to their investors and so in such cases, the definitional inequalities
for αi are strict. Consequently, the inequality in (2) is strict unless all managers index.
For economy of notation and space, the symbol ‘alpha’ is used very loosely for risk-
unadjusted performance improvement in i) and ii). In iii), instead of ‘traditional alpha’
defined as extra expected return in the CAPM framework [Jensen (1968)],88 we seek a more
flexible concept of value added by the manager so that individual implicit risk adjustment
of excess returns takes place in the expected utility framework. Thus, positive (negative)
alpha means that the manager delivers an increase (decrease) of the certainty equivalent rate
of return to the investor.89 The value and even the sign of alpha depends on individual
preferences but knowing all the alphas, each investor can construct her unique ranking of the
funds. In all cases, alphas are defined ex -fees, which is the relevant measure of performance
enhancement for investors.
Note that αi may be positive in i) and ii) while being negative in iii). This would be the
case when the extra risk taken by the manager is not justified by the excess returns delivered,
i.e. the expected return increases but its certainty equivalent decreases. The reverse is equally
possible. In general, it is possible for some active managers to identify disequilibrium prices
allowing them to construct portfolios with higher expected returns and lower risk than the
market portfolio. However, like the former, the latter cannot be achieved by all managers
because concentration of portfolios cannot reduce their aggregate riskiness. Quite on the
contrary, diversification is the only free lunch in the market and active managers tend to
miss on that. In sum, active management cannot deliver excess returns in the aggregate and
in addition to being costly, it generates extra active risk that must be distributed somehow
among the investors.90
87This is without loss of generality since u is unique only up to a positive affine transformation.
88Or, more generally, in multifactor models [Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997)].
89We do not operate with the weighted sum/average of the excess certainty equivalent rates of return, for it
has little economic meaning to the individual.
90While risk averters suffer a welfare loss, risk seekers would prefer active risk per se. Throughout, we restrict
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Now we consider the time interval [t, T ] with intermediate trading. This can be broken
into buy-and-hold subintervals, possibly of different length. Let us temporarily impose the
restriction that at any intermediate point τ , wτ = (w1τ , . . . , wIτ )
′ is unaffected by flows.91
We denote the return on fund i over the time interval as r˜iT and the return on the market
index as r˜XT . Since the latter is necessarily a weighted average of the former returns, the
constraint
I∑
i=1
wit · (r˜iT − r˜XT ) = 0 (20)
must hold for any wt. The (gross) fund and index returns over the entire period are simply
products of (gross) subperiod fund and index returns, respectively. Before the subtraction
of management fees, manager i adds r˜iT − r˜XT on top of r˜XT with the goal of achieving the
highest return and the lowest risk for the fund. However, (20) compared with (18) implies that
Proposition 1 holds over [t, T ] and so active managers necessarily participate in a negative-sum
alpha contest.
Such a contest is held over each subperiod, suggesting that the extra returns managers
deliver per unit of time generally do not have stationary statistical properties. Firstly, realiza-
tions of returns lead to intermediate shifts in w and hence in subperiod alphas. Secondly, if we
relax the restriction on intermediate flows, those will generally affect w, possibly in a major
way. Thirdly, (‘closet’) indexing of a manager with any skills leads to r˜i = r˜X and through
the constraint, it affects the investment opportunities of the residual active managers. And
last but not least, relative intellectual abilities of managers may change over time as well, thus
affecting their alphas. All this introduces extra risks to the process of forecasting managerial
skills.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
By Itoˆ’s Lemma, (7) implies
dY = −
(
f +
σ2
2
)
· dt+ σ · dW (21)
where Y = log ac . Let
Zt =
{
Yt if t < t0
0 if t ≥ t0 (22)
where t0 = min{t : Yt = 0} is the first time at which Yt hits the absorbing barrier of zero.92
We first treat the initial condition Z0 = z0 > 0 as fixed. The density fZ(z, t) of the process
Z satisfies the Fokker-Planck partial differential equation (Kolmogorov forward equation)
∂fZ
∂t
=
(
f +
σ2
2
)
· ∂fZ
∂z
+
σ2
2
· ∂
2fZ
∂z2
(23)
our analysis to risk-averse investors, assuming rational risk seekers could always flip a coin over index fund
returns as a cheaper substitute for pure active risk. In fact, the European roulette wheel has 37 pockets, which
gives the probability of zero about 2.7 % and the house edge drops to 1.35 % if the en prison rule applies.
Casinos can apparently offer more thrill for less money than many a fund manager.
91This only allows for market inflows and outflows distributed proportionately across all funds.
92An introduction to conditional diffusions is e.g. in Grimmett and Stirzaker (2001).
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for z > 0 subject to the boundary conditions
fZ(0, t) = 0 for t ≥ 0 (24)
fZ(z, 0) = δz0(z) for z ≥ 0 (25)
where δz0 is the Dirac delta function centered at z0. The unique solution turns out to be
fZ(z, t|z0) = φ [d−(z, t, z0)]
σ · √t −
φ [d+(z, t, z0)]
σ · √t · e
z0·(1+2·f ·σ−2) (26)
where
d±(z, t, z0) =
z ± z0 +
(
f + σ
2
2
)
· t
σ · √t
and φ(x) =
(
2 · pi · ex2
)− 1
2
is the standard normal probability density function. Hence
Prob(Zt = 0|Z0 = z0) = 1−
∫ ∞
0
fZ(z, t|z0) dz =
= Φ

(
f + σ
2
2
)
· t− z0
σ · √t
+ Φ
−
(
f + σ
2
2
)
· t+ z0
σ · √t
 · ez0·(1+2·f ·σ−2) (27)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
By (8), the density of Z0 = log
a0
c |a0 ≥ c0 is
fZ0(z0) =
(
2 · pi · κ · σ2κ
)− 1
2
Φ
[
(µκ−σ2κ/2)·κ−log c0
σκ·√κ
] · e− 12 · [z0−(µκ−σ2κ/2)·κ+log c]2σ2κ·κ (28)
for z0 ≥ log c0c and zero otherwise. Using (28), we integrate out z0 from (26) and (27) to
obtain the distribution of Zt as characterized by the probability mass
P†t = Prob(Zt = 0) = EZ0 [Prob(Zt = 0|Z0)] (29)
at z = 0, the density EZ0 [fZ(z, t|Z0)] for z > 0 and zero otherwise. For T > κ, the distribution
of a∗T = c · eZT−κ |ZT−κ > 0, ignoring the mass of failed funds/managers, is then characterized
by the density
fa∗T (â) =
EZ0
[
fZ
(
log âc , t|Z0
)]
â ·
(
1− P†t
) (30)
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for â > c and zero otherwise, which can be expressed as (12) with93
ξ1(â, c0) = D
− 1
2 ·
(
log â
σ2 · t +
f
σ2
+
µκ
σ2κ
)
−D 12 · log c0 (31)
ξ2(â, c) = exp
{
2 · σ2κ · κ · log âc
σ2 · t+ σ2κ · κ
·
(
log c
σ2κ · κ
− f
σ2
− µκ
σ2κ
)}
(32)
ξ3(â, c0, c) = ξ1(â, c0)− 2 ·D− 12 ·
log âc
σ2 · t (33)
ξ4(â) = â ·
[
2 · pi · (σ2 · t+ σ2κ · κ)] 12 · e [log â+(f+σ2/2)·t−(µκ−σ2κ/2)·κ]
2
2·(σ2·t+σ2κ·κ) (34)
ξ5(c0) =
(
µκ − σ2κ/2
) · κ− log c0
σκ ·
√
κ
(35)
where D = σ−2 · t−1 + σ−2κ · κ−1.
A.3 Peso Problem Engineering
Assume that trading is continuous and derivatives positions are marked to market on a daily
basis. The index value Xt follows (6). Let
[t] = max {s : s ≤ t & s ∈ N0} (36)
where t ∈ {0, d, 2d, . . .} is time measured in years and d−1 ∈ N is the number of trading days
per year. At each t = [t], the manager enters a short strangle position by writing out-of-the-
money European call and put index options that are equally likely to expire in the money at
t+ 1 and together constitute insurance against a k-sigma event, i.e. an event occurring with
probability 2 · Φ(−k/2). This is achieved with the strike price X[t] ·K− for calls and X[t] ·K+
for puts where
K± = eµX−(σX/2)·(σX±k). (37)
At time t, the value of a call and put, respectively, with expiration at [t] + 1 is
C
[t]+1
t = Xt · Φ(δ−+)−X[t] ·K− · Φ(δ−−) · e−r·([t]+1−t) (38)
P
[t]+1
t = X[t] ·K+ · Φ(−δ+−) · e−r·([t]+1−t) −Xt · Φ(−δ++) (39)
by the Black-Scholes-Merton formula where
δ∓± =
log(Xt/X[t])− µX + (σX/2) · (σX ∓ k)
σX ·
√
[t] + 1− t +
r
σX
± σX
2
and r is the riskfree rate of return on cash or its equivalents. At expiration time t = [t], the
value of a single strangle is
Ctt + P
t
t = max {Xt −Xt−1 ·K−, Xt−1 ·K+ −Xt, 0} . (40)
93To obtain the scaling factor for (30) and (12), we evaluate P†t in (29) by quadrature.
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The margin requirements follow Chicago Board Options Exchange (2000). At time t, the
balance on the margin account per strangle must be
Mt =
{
MCt + P
[t]+1
t if M
C
t > M
P
t
MPt + C
[t]+1
t if M
C
t ≤MPt
(41)
where
MCt = C
[t]+1
t + max
{
0.1 ·Xt, 0.15 ·Xt −max
{
X[t] ·K− −Xt, 0
}}
(42)
MPt = P
[t]+1
t + max
{
0.1 ·X[t] ·K+, 0.15 ·Xt −max
{
Xt −X[t] ·K+, 0
}}
. (43)
At t = [t], the manager writes nt = ν ·mt strangles where mt is their maximum number
determined by margin requirements and ν ∈ [0, 1]. At t > [t], the number of shorted strangles
is
nt = min
{
ν ·m[t],m[t]+d, . . . ,mt
}
, (44)
i.e. margin calls may force the fund to realize losses through liquidations prior to expiration.
At t ≥ 0, the long cash position per share of the fund is
Bt = At + nt ·
(
C
[t]+1
t + P
[t]+1
t
)
. (45)
At t > 0, marking to market gives the NAV plus fees currently due
A+t = Bt−d · er·d − nt−d ·
(
C
[t−d]+1
t + P
[t−d]+1
t
)
. (46)
Deducting the management fees (fM ) and potentially performance fees (fP ) then gives
At = (1− fM · d) ·A+t − fP ·max
{
A+t −Ht, 0
} · I(t = [t]) (47)
where
Ht = max
{
A0, A1, . . . , A[t−d]
} · er (48)
combines a high-water mark with a hurdle rate and the indicator function I returns unity if
true and zero otherwise. Initially, A+0 = A0. From mt = Bt(mt)/Mt, having replaced nt with
mt in (45), we obtain
mt =
At
Mt − C [t]+1t − P [t]+1t
. (49)
The fund goes through one-year incubation (κ = 1) with parameters kκ and νκ rather
than k and ν. Given A−1 = 1, A0 conditional on no intermediate liquidations and all options
expiring worthless at t = 0 (both conditions shortened as ‘ace’) is
A0| ace =
[
1 + n−1 ·
(
C0−1 + P
0
−1
)] · er−fM (50)
where management fees, for simplicity, are charged continuously and there are no performance
fees over the incubation period. We then set c0 = (A0| ace) · e−r in (14). Alternatively, no
incubation takes place (κ = 0), in which case A0 = c0 = 1. In the latter, we also simulate
the true process by suspending the shutdown rule altogether. Parameter values are under
Figure 3.
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